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FOREWORD 
I am pleased to introduce this report addressing online sexual 
coercion and extortion as a form of crime affecting children. The 
report provides a law enforcement perspective of this online 
threat and recommends actions as a part of our preventive 
campaign on this topic. 
Children are increasingly using the online environment to 
communicate and form relationships and this should be 
considered as a natural part of their development. However, it 
is our collective responsibility to educate them on the threats 
they may experience and also protect them to make the online 
environment as safe as possible. Where something untoward 
happens online we should provide clear and effective reporting 
and support mechanisms so they understand where to turn to for 
assistance.
Europol is fully committed to supporting the European Union 
Member States and all our partners in providing support to 
vulnerable members of our society in overcoming the risks posed 
in the online environment.
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CSAE child sexual abuse and exploitation
CSE child sexual exploitation
CSEM child sexual exploitation material
EC3 European Cybercrime Centre of Europol
EMPACT European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats
EU European Union
IWF
IWG
Internet Watch Foundation 
Interagency Working Group
NCMEC National Center for Missing and Exploited Children
NGO non-governmental organisation
oSCEC online sexual coercion and extortion of children
SGSEM self-generated sexually explicit material
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KEY CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
There appear to be two major motivations for the online sexual coercion and 
extortion of children (1)  (oSCEC): sexual and financial. Minors are the victims of 
both, however the sexual gratification of a perpetrator appears to be the primary 
motivating factor. Financially motivated offences are predominantly carried out by 
organised offenders based outside of the EU.
Recommendation: Differentiated strategies reflecting the differences in 
perpetrators’ motivation and profiles need to be created and implemented for the 
prevention and management of oSCEC-related behaviours.
One major limitation of the current capacity to assess the true nature of and 
successfully combat oSCEC is the lack of a common language and understanding of 
this phenomenon on the part of different stakeholders, such as legal and judicial 
systems, law enforcement and the private sector, including the media.
Recommendation: Advocate for initiatives contributing to a multidisciplinary, 
comprehensive approach, essential elements of which are prevention and 
education, criminalisation of various forms of conduct, reporting and intervention, 
along with policies designed to involve representatives of different sectors.
The expression ‘sextortion’, commonly used in public discourse, may lead to 
ambiguous and sometimes even paradoxical understanding of the crime affecting 
children. Use of this term implies equivalence with the crime affecting adults, and 
may lead to a failure to recognise more complex and nuanced features of the crime 
affecting children and its grave consequences for them.
Recommendation: Promote the use of proper terminology that exhaustively 
reflects the nature of oSCEC.
Online sexual coercion and extortion of children, as one of the new crime 
phenomena of the digital age, is heavily understudied. Gaps in the research limit 
the capacity to develop evidence-based policies and interventions, whether at 
the level of identifying new instances of oSCEC, developing suitable reporting 
mechanisms, legislative and preventive strategies or implementing interventions 
that meaningfully respond to the needs of victim, perpetrator and other 
stakeholder populations.
Recommendation: Conduct more in-depth academic research, especially in terms 
of victim and perpetrator characteristics, the offence process and the supporting 
victim–perpetrator interrelationship. As the financial victimisation of children is a 
comparatively new trend in online child sexual abuse and exploitation (CSAE (2)) 
further empirical work is required to identify particular factors at play that render 
young people vulnerable to financial exploitation.
1 While the term ‘online sexual coercion and extortion of children’ is used within this report this 
usage is not without its limitations. For user concern on this see the section ‘Terminology and 
working definition of online sexual coercion and extortion of children’.
2The phrase ‘child sexual abuse and exploitation’ is used within this document to maintain 
consistency with United Nations (UN)/United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (Unicef) policy.
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In identifying cases of oSCEC it is a challenge to reliably discriminate between 
consenting and non-consenting types of behaviours related to youth-produced 
sexual content (3), such as sexting (4), bearing in mind that the child’s own 
awareness of their exploitation may be compromised by deceptive solicitation 
strategies or simply a lack of awareness of what constitutes such practice.
Recommendation: Specific empirical focus needs to be given to how online sexual 
coercion and extortion offences are influenced by children and young people’s 
behaviour online and how to indicate profiles of risk and vulnerability in their 
online behaviour that may render them susceptible to online sexual coercion and 
extortion.
The complex and dynamic nature of online unlawful behaviour causes 
shortcomings in the recording of incidents of oSCEC which creates difficulties in 
assessing the scope of this crime threat.
Recommendation: Further investigate the online environment to make sure that 
criminal actions are fully reflected in legal solutions and are categorised in a 
coherent way enabling accurate data retrieval. The situation at each individual 
national level merits auxiliary research which should explain whether the current 
legislation can cope with the complexities of oSCEC, whether it is complementary 
and whether it is sufficient to ensure appropriate prosecution.
In the context of preventive intervention, a lack of awareness programmes 
explaining characteristics of oSCEC and addressing its key elements has been 
observed.
Recommendation: Deliver effective, tailor-made awareness programmes to 
make children and young people aware of acceptable and unacceptable online 
communication, including the illegality of some online practices, with a particular 
focus on those in the peer environment. Such programmes should be included in 
school curricula.
The reporting mechanisms follow a multidisciplinary approach, in the form of 
cross-reporting, where different actors are represented. The differences between 
the goals of each of the actors, especially a disconnect between reporting 
mechanisms and supportive initiatives, pose challenges for coherence and 
effectiveness in this domain.
Recommendation: Conduct a review of solutions in this domain at national level in 
individual EU Member States to make sure that they reflect all scenarios of oSCEC, 
ensuring a potential child victim can be provided with tailor-made assistance. 
Prevention campaigns should be closely linked with the reporting and support 
mechanisms to fully achieve their goals.
The online environment where sexual coercion and extortion of children can be 
detected needs to be monitored by platform providers to find the most effective 
ways of eliminating that behaviour.
Recommendation: Private sector to continue efforts in enhancing detection, 
preventive intervention and reporting mechanisms introduced through their own 
services.
3 ‘Nude or semi-nude images or videos produced by a young person of themselves engaging 
in erotic or sexual activity and intentionally shared by any electronic means’, Internet Watch 
Foundation  (IWF), Emerging patterns and trends report #1 — Youth-produced sexual content, 
2015, p. 3. Available at: https://www.iwf.org.uk/resources/research
4 Definitions of ‘sexting’ were reviewed by the Interagency Working Group (IWG) on Sexual 
Exploitation of Children, in Terminology guidelines for the protection of children from sexual 
exploitation and sexual abuse, 2016, p. 44. Available at: http://luxembourgguidelines.org
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INTRODUCTION  Aim
The aim of this report is twofold: to raise awareness of oSCEC 
as one of the most significant online threats against children (5); 
and to contribute to the public discourse on effective responses 
to it, especially in terms of reporting and support mechanisms in 
the EU Member States.
 Methodology 
The report draws heavily from the law enforcement version 
commissioned by experts representing the Child Sexual 
Exploitation European Multidisciplinary Platform Against 
Criminal Threats (EMPACT-Cyber-CSE) community (6), released in 
December 2016. Its objective was to increase the understanding 
of this crime phenomenon at the level of law enforcement 
agencies in order to support them in preventing and combating 
this crime phenomenon.
As this document addresses a heavily understudied crime 
area, the methodology has clear limitations. The information 
presented in the report is a combination of the surveyed 
observations of 30 experts representing the EMPACT 
community (child sexual exploitation (CSE) experts) (7), analysis 
of open-source case data (8) and explanations provided by 
representatives of academia. To make the response of law 
enforcement complete, this report also builds on expertise 
gathered by the members of the dedicated team, dealing with 
online CSAE in the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) (10). 
Where appropriate, the answers of CSE experts have been 
supplemented with information originating from other 
specialised sources, organisations or institutions (11).
The report does not cover legislative responses to the crime 
phenomenon being examined. Related concepts such as sexting, 
self-generated sexual material, grooming and online solicitation, 
along with oSCEC in peer-perpetrated cases, are mentioned but 
are not studied in depth.
5 EC3, The internet organised threat assessment, 2016, pp. 10 and 24. 
Available at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-
reports/internet-organised-crime-threat-assessment#fndtn-tabs-0-
bottom-2
6 More information about this model of cooperation is available at: https://
www.europol.europa.eu/content/eu-policy-cycle-empact
7 The collection of responses to the survey ended in April 2015, so the 
situation reflected in the report refers to the 4-year period before that date. 
8 A reference is made to the outcomes of scanning of open sources for 
sexual coercion and extortion cases reported from 2012 until the end 
of March 2017 — 95 in total, 87 referring to minors as victims. Obvious 
limitations should be highlighted here as all the research was conducted in 
English.
10 More information is available at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/ec3/
child-sexual-exploitation
11 All websites were accessed on 15 May 2017.
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There is no doubt that much has recently changed in the 
online behaviour thanks to technological expansion offering 
new communication channels, growing internet coverage 
and the widespread availability of mobile devices. One of 
the new and emerging manifestations in online behaviour 
is a phenomenon referred to in this report as online sexual 
coercion and extortion. The forms of online sexual coercion 
and extortion have recently been reported by a number of 
sources, however the range of reported scenarios varied in 
many respects.
A comprehensive scan of open sources revealed that this 
very specific kind of cyber-enabled crime modus operandi 
— based, in simple terms, on blackmailing those individuals 
whose sexual photo or video was made available in an 
online environment — has been utilised in numerous 
ways, affecting victims across all demographics. Various 
ways of outlining the phenomenon under investigation 
were also found, along with a great deal of diversity in the 
keywords used to describe it, such as ‘sextortion’, ‘sexual 
extortion’, ‘sexual blackmail’, ‘webcam blackmail’, ‘webcam 
sex scams’, ‘sexual harassment’ and ‘dating scam’. Some 
of these expressions were used interchangeably, even if 
they referred to different types of behaviour (12). A natural 
consequence of this situation was that even when some 
sources attempted to provide definitions of sexual coercion 
and extortion, their scope was also wide-ranging.
It is possible to indicate the key elements of online sexual 
coercion and extortion that appeared in the majority of the 
reported scenarios:
 › material — any material (information, photo or video) 
the victim seeks to keep private.
 › threat — what a victim would like to prevent from 
happening, in most cases the release of material that 
victim seeks to keep private.
 › value — what the perpetrator demands from a victim.
12 E.g. the term ‘sextortion’ was used by the International Association 
of Women Judges in 2008 to describe corruption involving sexual 
exploitation. Thomson Reuters Foundation and International 
Association of Women Judges, Combating sextortion — A comparative 
study of laws to prosecute corruption involving sexual exploitation, 
2015, p. 9. Available at: http://www.trust.org/publications/
i/?id=588013e6-2f99-4d54-8dd8-9a65ae2e0802
The presence of these elements together in the online 
environment is essential for the commission of the 
crime (13). The occurrence of sexual material that can be 
acquired by a perpetrator is crucial to trigger the whole 
process. It also differentiates online sexual coercion and 
extortion from related concepts, such as the abuse of 
power to obtain a sexual benefit or advantage.
 1.1. Current state of knowledge 
Much of the empirical research in the domain of child 
sexual abuse and exploitation has focused on child 
sexual exploitation material (CSEM (14)) or CSEM-related 
offences, variously involving acts of download, possession, 
distribution or production (15). Significant legal and 
media attention has been concentrated on adults who 
use technology to engage in sexual contact with children 
through processes of sexual grooming, solicitation or 
extortion, whereas comparatively little research attention 
has been given to this problem (16).
Online grooming and solicitation incidents are known 
to vary widely in their presentation. That is why both 
phenomena have been variously defined in national and 
13 For user concern on this see also Açar, K. V., ‘Sexual extortion of 
children in cyberspace’, International Journal of Cyber Criminology, 
Vol. 10, No 2, 2016, p. 113, and Kopecký, K., ‘Online blackmail of Czech 
children focused on so-called “sextortion” (analysis of culprit and 
victim behaviors)’, Telematics and Informatics, Vol. 34, No 11-19, 2016, 
p. 16.
14 IWG, 2016, p. 38; Frangez, D., Klancnik, A. T., Karer, M. Z., Ludvigsen, 
B. E., Konczyk, J., Perez, F. R. and Lewin, M., ‘The importance 
of terminology related to child sexual exploitation — Revija za 
Kriminalistiko’, Kriminologijo, Vol. 66, No 4, 2015, pp. 291-299.
15 Seto, M. C., Hanson, R. K. and Babchishin, K. M., ‘Contact sexual 
offending by men with online sexual offenses’, Sexual Abuse: A Journal 
of Research and Treatment, Vol. 23, 2010, pp. 124-145; Taylor, M. and 
Quayle, E., ‘Internet sexual offending’, in Brown, J. M. E. and Campbell, 
E. A. E. (eds), The Cambridge handbook of forensic psychology, 
Cambridge University Press, New York, 2010, pp. 520–526.
16 Seto, M. C., Wood, J. M., Babchishin, K. M. and Flynn, S., ‘Online 
solicitation offenders are different from child pornography offenders 
and lower risk contact sexual offenders’, Law and Human Behavior, 
Vol. 36, No 4, 2012, p. 320.
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international law, policy and in academic literature. Recent 
concerns around oSCEC have prompted renewed focus 
on these definitions. This is because online grooming 
and solicitation activities are related to and overlap with 
incidents of online child sexual coercion and extortion. This 
overlap is most conspicuous in sexually motivated, adult-
perpetrated cases where strategies of overt manipulation 
and intimidation (17) are used to coerce the child into sexual 
conduct — whether in the procurement of CSEM or physical 
sexual activity.
Also, little empirical focus has been given to more recent, 
related concerns around children and young people’s own 
sexualised use of technology and their role in relation to 
online CSAE (18). The sexual material and activities targeted, 
commoditised or procured by perpetrators through 
coercion and extortion have been highlighted by recent 
definitions of oSCEC (19). Therefore, consideration needs to 
be given to the types of youth-produced behaviours related 
to sexual content (20), such as sexting, that are implicated 
in these offences. It is critical to differentiate between 
those children and young people who sext, or produce and 
send self-generated sexually explicit material (SGSEM) of 
their own volition, and those who are coerced into such 
behaviours. Empirical focus needs to be given to how online 
sexual coercion and extortion offences are influenced by 
children and young people’s behaviour online and indicate 
profiles of risk and vulnerability in their behaviour that 
may render them susceptible to online sexual coercion and 
extortion.
The above described gaps and silos in the research present 
a number of problems. They compromise the ability to 
understand ‘contact’ forms of online CSAE (21) and to keep 
pace with the evolving nature of these phenomena. This is 
particularly true given the increasing intersection between 
CSEM and ‘contact’ forms of online CSAE as present 
in oSCEC. Critically, they limit the capacity to develop 
evidence-based policies and interventions, whether at the 
level of identifying new instances of oSCEC, developing 
suitable reporting mechanisms, legislative and preventive 
strategies or implementing interventions that meaningfully 
respond to the needs of victim, perpetrator and other 
stakeholder populations.
17 Sullivan, 2009.
18 Phippen, A. and Leaton Grey, S., Invisibly blighted — The digital 
erosion of childhood, UCL Press, 2016.
19 E.g. National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), 
2015 and 2016; UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2015.
20 E.g. IWF, 2015.
21 Livingstone, S., and Haddon, L., ‘EU kids online’, Zeitschrift Für 
Psychologie/Journal of Psychology, Vol. 217, No 4, 2009, p. 236.
1.2. Characteristics of online 
sexual coercion and extortion of 
children 
1.2.1. MOTIVATION OF PERPETRATOR
The majority of open-source cases of oSCEC featured 
activities with an apparent sexual motivation or interest, 
where the objective was the procurement of sexual 
material or activity (83 %). However, in a fraction of cases a 
patently economic interest prevailed. Similarly, in a handful 
of cases there was a mixed profile of financial and sexual 
interest, indicative of a more exploitative profile of sexual 
offender.
These findings are consistent with recent data published 
by specialised sources. To review this increasing form 
of sexual victimisation in greater depth, the National 
Center for Missing and Exploited Children (22) (NCMEC) 
analysed a subset of sexual coercion and extortion-related 
CyberTipline reports (23) received from October 2013 until 
April 2016, reclassified by CyberTipline analysts as online 
enticement blackmail (24). Based on the information that 
was indicated or known when the CyberTipline report was 
made (25), offenders appeared to have committed oSCEC 
with one of three primary objectives:
 › to acquire increasingly more explicit sexual content 
(photos/videos) of the child (78 % of reports);
 › to have sex with the child (5 %); or
 › to obtain money or goods from the child (7 %).
Coercion and/or extortion which centres around financial 
benefit, rather than sexual gratification for the perpetrator, 
is a comparatively new trend in online CSAE. A general 
observation based on the collected information is that 
minors are not primary targets of financially motivated 
perpetrators (26). They are, however, among the victims of 
this criminal activity. One of the well-known cases of this 
22 The National Center for Missing & Exploited Children is a non-profit 
corporation, the mission of which is to help find missing children, 
reduce child sexual exploitation and prevent child victimisation. More 
information is available at: http://www.missingkids.com/About
23 The CyberTipline provides public and electronic service providers 
(ESPs) with the ability to report online (and via freephone numbers) 
instances of online enticement of children for sexual acts, extra-
familial child sexual molestation, child pornography, child sex tourism, 
child sex trafficking, unsolicited obscene materials sent to a child, 
misleading domain names and misleading words or digital images on 
the internet.
24 NCMEC, 2016. Available at: http://www.missingkids.org/sextortion
25 In 2 % of these reports multiple objectives were indicated; in 11 % 
of reports the objective could not be determined.
26 For user concern on this see also. http://www.nationalcrimeagency.
gov.uk/news/960-help-available-for-webcam-blackmail-victims-
don-t-panic-and-don-t-pay; https://scamalytics.com/wp-content/
uploads/2015/02/GDI-Scammers-Online-Dating-Fraud-Scamalytics.
pdf
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kind was the suicide of a 17-year-old boy from Scotland, 
who died having been targeted by a group operating from 
the Philippines and after being tricked into taking part in 
an explicit Skype chat. He believed that he was talking to 
a girl of the same age in the United States. He was then 
blackmailed by the offender demanding money, and 
threatened that if he failed to pay his naked images would 
be posted on social networking sites (27).
It also seems that there are certain differences in how 
the scope of criminal activity is defined by the offender’s 
language skills. In general, an offender speaking widely 
known languages is able to reach more potential targets, 
whereas an offender speaking a language which is not 
widespread will not extend beyond the national level (28). 
However, in the case of financially motivated perpetrators, 
criminal groups will generally operate between countries 
with a common language. To date, the majority of countries 
where victims have been targeted are those where English 
is a primary internet language, such as the United Kingdom, 
United States, Australia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Indonesia 
and Malaysia. Similar crimes emerging in French-speaking 
Africa, targeting France, have also been seen (29).
The phenomenon of oSCEC should always be looked at from 
the victim’s perspective while acknowledging differences in 
perpetrators’ motivations and, as a consequence, in their 
profiles. In this context approaches excluding the remote 
extortion of money using sexual images (30) unless the 
perpetrator also demands the production of further sexual 
images or videos from the scope of the oSCEC threat may 
not necessarily be appropriate, as they miss a sexual crime 
context. Sexual material created by a minor as a response 
to an enticing online message can be categorised as CSEM. 
The risk to a victim extends beyond the initial exploitation 
and includes revictimisation due to its online posting. Once 
in worldwide circulation the sexual material may trigger the 
attention of people who are sexually interested in children 
and in grooming or online solicitation. Financially motivated 
perpetrators may consider the commercial distribution 
of the sexual material gained through remote coercion of 
money as an opportunity for gaining additional revenue. 
In the future, a retail market for CSEM produced in the 
process of sexual coercion or extortion cannot be ruled out, 
although this observation is still anecdotal.
1.2.2. CIRCUMSTANCES
In describing the ways children are approached, CSE 
experts referred to both the environments where 
27 http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-edinburgh-east-
fife-27251900
28 EC3, The internet organised threat assessment, 2014, p. 30. Available 
at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/ec3/strategic-analysis
29 https://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Cybercrime/Online-safety/
Sextortion
30 E.g. Brookings’ report, Sextortion: Cybersecurity, teenagers, 
and remote sexual assault, 2016, p. 11. Available at: http://www.
brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2016/05/sextortion/
sextortion1.pdf?la=en
the suspect contacted the minor and the means of 
communication which were used for this purpose. The most 
common answers were: ‘social media’, ‘chat applications’ 
and ‘webcam’. Only one expert mentioned online games. 
According to them, while some platforms were more 
likely to be used to approach victims than others, there 
is little evidence to suggest there is anything specific to 
these platforms that encourages coercive and exploitative 
behaviour. They are simply platforms used by a high volume 
of young people, which provides a viable opportunity to 
those wishing to contact them for potential abuse.
National differences applicable in relation to targeting 
potential victims are also worth highlighting in this context. 
Services with largely domestic markets will for the most 
part enable potential victims to be targeted only by fellow 
nationals. In contrast, services with a global reach can 
facilitate such activities by both local perpetrators and 
those in a different country. This is an important distinction, 
implying as it does that globally popular services are likely 
to give rise to (and indeed report) more internationally 
complex cases (31). The use of gaming platforms that allow 
the user to communicate with many other players with 
similar interests have a strong potential for abuse, including 
coercion and extortion.
Some differences have been observed in the targeting 
of potential victims. There are indications that organised 
crime groups target a broad spectrum of individuals, and 
send out bulk requests to groups of potential victims rather 
than targeting them on an individual basis. This seems not 
to be the case for sexually motivated perpetrators, who use 
social engineering methods and apply manipulative tactics 
aimed at establishing more individual relationships. In both 
cases offenders will often have used the same social media 
platform through which contact was initially made to obtain 
lists of their victim’s contacts to target other victims.
The experiences of CSE experts are consistent with the 
outcomes of NCMEC’s analysis where the use of multiple 
platforms was indicated in 42 % of the reports. When 
communication occurred across multiple platforms, the 
offender would intentionally and systematically move the 
communication with the child from one online platform 
type to another. Typically the offender approached the child 
on a social networking site where they learned personal 
information about the child and then switched to an 
anonymous messaging app or live-stream video chat where 
they obtained sexually explicit content from the child (32).
Little is known in terms of how long the process of online 
coercion and extortion lasts. CSE experts indicated that the 
shortest period observed by them was a few hours whereas 
the longest one was ‘many years’, and suggested that 
differences in the length of this process may depend on 
the perpetrator’s motivation. Examples of cases supporting 
this observation can be retrieved from open-source 
data, however empirical evidence is needed before any 
judgement can be made.
31 Virtual Global Taskforce, Environmental scan 2012, p. 18. 
Available at: http://www.virtualglobaltaskforce.com/wp-content/
uploads/2013/05/VGT-Environmental-Scan.pdf
32 NCMEC, 2016.
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The time factor plays also a significant role in terms of a 
waiting period between the time the offender acquires the 
sexual material of the child and the time when coercion and 
extortion begins. The NCMEC data indicates that, where 
the waiting period could be determined (33), in 80 % of the 
cases the blackmail appeared to occur the same day. In 
financially motivated cases this period can be very short, 
which may cause extreme distress and pressure to the 
victim, posing challenges to finding the most efficient forms 
of intervention.
While recognising that a comprehensive picture of oSCEC 
is still developing it is clear that, regardless of motivation 
of the perpetrators, the online environment does expand 
opportunities for the perpetrator in the following areas:
 › perceived anonymity and use of manipulative 
techniques;
 › elimination of geographical barriers — opportunity for 
abuser to receive funds regardless of location;
 › high number of potential victims;
 › management — in terms of actions to be performed, 
such as creation of sexual material, photos or videos, 
participation in tailor-made live-streaming of child 
abuse;
 › lowering risk — in terms of prohibiting disclosure or 
discovery of the engagement;
 › level of threat to victims — ease of distribution of 
material.
The facilitating role of online technologies and 
environments, however, needs to be understood not only 
for offender facilitation. Online technology can have a part 
to play in the victimisation process with regard to how 
children and young people’s behaviour in online platforms 
can increase their vulnerability to oSCEC (34).
1.3. Key elements of online sexual 
coercion and extortion of children  
1.3.1. MATERIAL
The CSE experts reported that sexual material was recorded 
by both victim and offender. The images/videos were 
created by minors for private purposes and then got into 
unwanted circulation (accidentally or by use of malware 
or hacking (35)), or they were created during a deceptive 
conversation with a perpetrator. The choice of manipulative 
tactics, often used in combination, depends on the 
33 39 % of incidents.
34 Ybarra, M. L. and Mitchell, K. J., ‘How risky are social networking 
sites? A comparison of places online where youth sexual solicitation 
and harassment occurs’, Pediatrics, Vol. 121, No 2, 2008, pp. 350-357.
35 https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/stop-sextortion-brochure.pdf/
view
characteristics of both the perpetrator and the victim.
Information collected by NCMEC (36) provides more details 
on the manipulation tactics that were used by offenders:
 › reciprocation: ‘I’ll show you if you show me’;
 › developing a bond by establishing a friendship/romantic 
relationship online;
 › using multiple online identities against a given child, such 
as the person coercing or extorting for sexual content 
as well as pretending to be a supportive friend or a 
sympathetic victim of the same offender;
 › pretending to be younger;
 › pretending to be female when they are really male;
 › accessing the child’s online account (e.g. social media) 
without authorisation and stealing sexual content 
involving the child;
 › recording the child unbeknownst to them while on a 
video chat;
 › initially offering something to the child, such as money or 
drugs, in exchange for sexually explicit material;
 › pretending to work for a modelling agency.
In the case of financially motivated perpetrators sexual 
material is, in most cases, created on a consensual basis, as 
a response to an enticing online message and manipulative 
techniques. This includes use of the pre-recorded footage, 
often created by specialised software or obtained from 
pornography and live-sex camera sites.
1.3.2. THREAT 
The tactics used to obtain primary sexual material from 
a child need to be differentiated from those that a 
perpetrator uses to ensure their compliance. The most 
common ones reported by both CSE experts (19 out of 22 
answers) and NCMEC (67 %) (37) were offenders threatening 
to post previously acquired sexual content online  and, 
often, specifically threatening to post it in a place for 
family and friends to see (29 %). Other tactics used by the 
offenders included:
 › physically threatening to hurt or sexually assault the 
child or family members;
 › threatening to commit suicide themselves;
 › threatening to create sexual content involving the child 
by using digital editing tools;
 › creating a fake profile as the child and threatening to 
post sexual content involving  the child;
 › saving sexually explicit conversations with the child and 
threatening to post them online (38).
36 NCMEC, 2016.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
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In addition, some CSE experts referred to incentives or 
particular deceptive practices, that is, when the perpetrator 
introduced him/herself as representing some kind of 
authority.
It is worth noting that the majority of perpetrators’ threats 
are based on the sexual nature of the victim–perpetrator 
relationship. The sensitivity of this relationship, especially 
in the child’s case, is a factor that strengthens the impact 
of these threats, as the victim would like to prevent it 
from being revealed. Additionally, the child’s distress may 
be greater if they believe they are participating in illegal 
activity. In many cases the coercive strategies employed to 
support the procurement of sexual or financial gains may 
conform to profiles of cyberharassment and cyberstalking 
behaviour.
Open-source data shows examples of very 
specific kinds of threats. In one case a 
perpetrator who used the internet to meet 
young girls on modelling and pro-anorexia 
websites manipulated the girls by acting as 
an anorexia coach who encouraged them to 
starve themselves. He also requested that they 
send him sexually explicit photos. If the girls 
did not do it, he threatened not to coach them 
and he ridiculed them (*). 
* http://tucson.com/news/local/man-sentenced-to-years-in-federal-
sextortion-case/article_8bddebfc-ef26-11e6-b2fa-2b533309c8fd.html
1.3.3. VALUE
In indicating what was most demanded from children 
in oSCEC schemes the responses of the CSE experts are 
consistent with the previously cited NCMEC data. When 
questioned about the proportion of solicitations related 
to demands for money the majority of the CSE experts 
assessed it as ‘10 % or less’ and explained that the biggest 
bulk of the demands were for more CSEM. In their opinion 
sexual coercion and extortion targeting children is, in the 
majority, content driven.
This aspect is worth exploring further by making a 
reference to other observations by NCMEC (39). When 
sexually explicit content was the apparent objective, 
offenders commonly escalated their demands, both 
in the quantity of images/videos and/or in the level of 
39 NCMEC, 2016. 
seriousness. It was of course not uncommon for children 
to believe that complying would make the blackmail 
stop. In some extreme instances, reports indicated that 
the child was coerced or extorted to provide videos of a 
certain length while performing specific sexually explicit 
behaviours, and sometimes even to include other children, 
such as siblings or peers, in the images/videos.
The demand to include other children requires particular 
attention, as it seems to be a newly observed trend in 
oSCEC. In such cases perpetrators leverage control over 
an established victim to gain access to other children, who 
are family members or friends. Even children who use safe 
practices in the online environment or younger children 
who may not use the internet yet can be targeted this way. 
According to NCMEC (40), in 24 % of the reports retrieved 
reporters mentioned that they suspected or knew that 
additional children were targeted by the same offender.
A majority of respondents (21 out of 30) to the question of 
whether the offender attempted to convince or succeeded 
in convincing the child to create more sexual material 
replied in the affirmative. The numbers reported by the 
experts in terms of the proportion of SGSEM that appeared 
to have been produced specifically for the suspect under 
investigation varied from 12 % to 100 %, and the average 
was 72 %. Some experts (nine) have not determined a 
percentage but mentioned that this occurred in ‘the 
majority’ of or ‘almost all’ cases. Six experts did not provide 
or possess such information. These numbers are important 
indicators (notwithstanding the small sample) that the 
content-driven type of online sexual coercion and extortion 
affecting children can significantly increase the amount 
of CSEM in circulation. The newly produced CSEM can be 
commoditised by likeminded distributors and downloaders.
In terms of non-content-driven perpetrators’ demands 
the experts that provided information (n = 17) were 
divided. Eight reported demands for offline encounters 
with the victims, four reported demands for money and 
two referred to demands to provide more contacts — 
from the child’s peer group. A single expert reported both 
money and offline encounters and three experts did not 
report any further demands. It is worth noting, that when 
money/goods were the apparent objective, the CSE experts 
indicated that the money was to be sent via a money 
transfer service or online payment system. One expert 
reported that offenders tried to get credit card information 
from a child, either directly or by having the child sign up 
for a particular website that required that information.
40 Ibid.
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 1.4. Scope 
The task of collecting information to support an assessment 
of the scope of online sexual coercion and extortion 
affecting children is challenging. It is crucial to consider that 
its incidences may be heavily underreported. Victims can be 
reluctant to come forward to law enforcement about their 
victimisation due to embarrassment regarding the material 
provided to the perpetrator, or may be unaware of the fact 
that they have been the subject of a criminal offence.
Since oSCEC occurs at the intersection of a number 
of criminal behaviours, including the grooming and 
online solicitation of children and the sexual coercion 
and extortion of adults, it bears the hallmarks of these 
offences. This overlap can give rise to conceptual confusion 
regarding the nature of online child sexual coercion and 
extortion and the criminal offences that may be involved. 
These factors heavily influence the process of data 
collection. Additionally, the very complex nature of this 
crime phenomenon and the different ways of reporting its 
instances raise challenges beyond the sort of data that is 
collected, including which organisation (or part thereof) 
should be targeted in this data-collection process.
Some of the recently published reports can, however, 
be helpful in shaping a picture of oSCEC. The authors of 
the Brookings report, who aimed at defining the remote 
coercion of sexual material or activity and focused on 78 
cases involving at least 1 397 victims, stated that in their 
opinion this was undoubtedly just the tip of the iceberg. 
According to them, if the prosecutorial estimates in the 
various cases are to be believed, the number of actual 
victims probably ranges between 3 000 and 6 500 (41). They 
also noted that 55 of those cases (71 %) involved only minor 
victims and an additional 14 (18 %) involved a mix of minor 
victims and adult victims. In nine cases (12 %), all identified 
victims were adults (42).
At the time of writing this report every attempt at 
determining the scope of the crime threat based on 
statistical data is close to speculation, as there are no 
data sets which could be used for comparison. Some 
assumptions may, however, be drawn from the data 
collected by NCMEC. The total number of sexual coercion 
and extortion-related CyberTipline reports received 
from October 2013 until April 2016 by NCMEC was 1 428. 
According to NCMEC, since the CyberTipline began tracking 
this phenomenon in October 2013 these reports have been 
on the rise. In just the first two full years, between 2014 
and 2015, there was a 90 % increase in the total number of 
reports. This pattern has continued, with oSCEC reports up 
150 % within the first several months of 2016 compared to 
the number of reports in that same time frame in 2014 (43). 
Still, the increasing numbers of the reported cases can also 
be interpreted as an outcome of raising awareness about 
41 Brookings’ report, p. 4. 
42 NCMEC, 2016.
43 Ibid.
the problem rather than growth of the crime threat itself.
Information provided by CSE experts for the purpose of 
this research also had obvious limitations due to different 
classification of oSCEC cases. The reasons for this are the 
nature of the case and the stage when coercion and/or 
extortion takes place, as an investigation may be launched 
into grooming cases or online CSEM distribution, and 
at a later stage it may be determined that elements of 
coercion or extortion are part of it. On top of that, cases 
of financially motivated sexual coercion and extortion may 
be conducted outside of units dealing with CSAE (44). All of 
this makes the collection of information very complicated 
and, in most cases, not retrievable in an automated way. 
Additionally, data on online sexual offences against children 
is not always collected at the national level.
Internationally comparable information remains an 
aspiration. This is because when the data is recorded 
and collected at the national level, and where national 
legislation is approximate, there are variations in the 
precise provisions for data collection that make national 
data sets not directly comparable to those of other 
countries. The use of a mix of legislation regarding sexual 
abuse and exploitation together with the ‘regular’ law for 
extortion was pointed out by some respondents.
Questions regarding the number of cases of oSCEC with 
which their units dealt in the last 4 years and the number 
of cases that concluded with the successful prosecution 
of a suspect or suspects were the most problematic for 
the experts. Some of them had nothing to report due to 
the lack of statistical data, and explained this by making a 
reference to one or more reasons explained above. This, 
in addition to significant discrepancies in the numbers 
provided by other experts, did not allow any observations 
to be made.
At the request of EC3, NCMEC retrieved CyberTipline 
reports on oSCEC concerning EU Member States (as a 
possible location of either a victim or an offender) received 
from October 2013 until April 2016. The total number 
of reports was 123, and they were sent to the following 
countries: United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, Sweden, 
Ireland, Romania, Finland, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, the 
Netherlands, France, Estonia, Denmark, Bulgaria and 
Austria. In the vast majority of reports the offender’s 
motivation was sexual: the demands were for sexually 
explicit content (98) or to have sex with a child (four). 
Demands of a financial nature were expressed in five cases.
On a final note, it is worth referring to the statistics 
collected by the UK National Crime Agency’s Anti-Kidnap 
and Extortion Unit (AKEU), which during 2016 received 
1 247 reports of offences assessed as cyber-enabled 
blackmail, more than triple the figure for the whole of the 
previous year (386) (45). Where the demand indicating the 
44 As is the case with the UK National Crime Agency’s Anti-Kidnap and 
Extortion Unit (AKEU).
45 Information partially available at: http://www.nationalcrimeagency.
gov.uk/news/960-help-available-for-webcam-blackmail-victims-don-
t-panic-and-don-t-pay. Additional information on 2016 case data was 
shared with EC3 upon request.
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offender’s motivation was specified (738), the majority of 
cases (665) were financially motivated.
1.5. Terminology and working 
definition of online sexual coercion 
and extortion of children
The vague or absent definitions of the concept of online 
sexual coercion and extortion across open sources 
surveyed for this report may be a possible explanation for 
the broad use of seemingly self-explanatory terms, such 
as ‘sextortion’. However, its usage in public discourse can 
be questioned. Unqualified use of this term — an amalgam 
of ‘sexual’ and ‘extortion’ — can be problematic, as it 
can promote reductionist thinking around the problem 
of oSCEC, suggesting an overly simplistic image of what 
is in effect a damaging and complex phenomenon. The 
unqualified use of this term, along with other terms of 
a similar nature, can also lead to the development of 
ambiguous and sometimes even paradoxical concepts (46). 
This confusion could be mitigated by legal definitions or 
examples of the context in which they are used in legislative 
instruments, but neither international conventions nor EU 
legislation define these terms.
Since most national legislation already covers the criminal 
offence of extortion the phrase ‘sexual extortion’ would 
seem to be more relevant, however the correctness of this 
approach can still be questioned. Some legislation ties the 
concept of ‘extortion’ inextricably to the taking of money 
or property through use of violence or threats (47), whereas 
the purpose of sexual extortion is to obtain sexually explicit 
material or sexual favours. The term ‘sexual extortion’ is 
therefore not broad enough to cover the full variety of 
online manifestations.
‘Coercion’ might therefore be a more relevant word, as 
its meaning is broader and can also be used in connection 
to any other type of act the victim might be forced to 
commit, such as acts with sexual connotations. It is worth 
mentioning that both the Lanzarote Convention (48) and the 
EU directive (49) use the word ‘coercion’ but not ‘extortion’.
Acknowledging all of the aspects presented above, the 
term ‘sexual coercion and extortion’ is used within this 
report, however this usage is not without its limitations. For 
instance, the word ‘sexual’ defines the concept as sexual 
in nature, when in some cases the primary motivation or 
objective for the extortive exchange is social gain or malice 
(as may occur in peer-perpetrated cases). Similarly, some 
children may be entirely unaware of the acquisition or 
46 For user concern on this see also IWG, 2016, p. 53.
47 E.g. German Criminal Code, Section 253, Extortion.
48 The Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children 
Against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse.
49 Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and 
child pornography.
procurement of their image and in those cases the defining 
characteristic is deception rather than coercion.
The use of the term ‘sexual coercion and extortion’ can 
also be problematic in the context of financially motivated 
procurements involving children, as the primary motivation 
for such offences is not sexual. However, given the sexual 
nature of the conduct and/or material that is targeted 
or procured in the exchange, this use may be justified. 
Alternative terminology such as ‘economic sexual extortion’ 
or ‘commercial sexual extortion’ may also be appropriate 
for use in public discourse, as it directly refers to the 
financial nature of unlawful behaviour and the motivation 
of its perpetrators.
The open-source searches returned few documents which 
contained a definition of online sexual coercion and 
extortion (50). In terms of oSCEC most of the documents 
originating from specialised sources referred in the first 
place to related concepts in online behaviour, such as 
sexting, grooming and solicitation. On limited occasions 
they introduced elements of online sexual coercion 
and extortion as their escalated form (51). Some other 
proposals were retrieved from websites of organisations or 
institutions dealing with combating CSAE (52). The majority 
of them, however, used the term ‘sextortion’ in their 
definitions, which suggests that more efforts are needed in 
promoting the use of proper terminology.
Bearing the previously described characterising features 
and key elements of the phenomenon under investigation 
in mind, in broad terms oSCEC may be defined as the 
targeting and commoditisation of a child, or the visual 
depiction of that child, by technological means, using sexual 
images and/or videos depicting that child, through coercion 
or extortion for the purposes of sexual gain (for example 
new CSEM or a sexual encounter), financial gain or other 
personal gain (such as psychosocial gain, e.g. popularity or 
malicious satisfaction).
50 E.g. Brookings’ report, p. 10; https://www.wearethorn.org/
sextortion/; https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/
security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-sextortion-in-the-far-east.pdf
51 E.g. UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Study on the effects 
of new information technologies on the abuse and exploitation 
of children, 2015, p. 12. Available at: https://www.unodc.org/
documents/organized-crime/cybercrime/Study_on_the_Effects.pdf
52 E.g. https://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Cybercrime/Online-
safety/Sextortion; http://virtualglobaltaskforce.com/resources/faqs/
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VICTIMS AND 
PERPETRATORS
 2.1. Perpetrator profile 
While the primary motivators for online child sexual coercion 
and extortion behaviours appear to be resolvable to sexual 
and financial interests, it is important to consider that the 
motivations for sexually exploitative behaviours are rarely 
limited to one of these factors. Existing sexual offence 
research indicates that motivations for such behaviours are 
typically multidimensional. In the case of offenders with 
exploitative profiles, the sexual coercion and extortion 
offence may be both financially and sexually motivated. 
These motivations and offence-related inclinations can 
extend to a range of other factors, such as antisocial 
tendencies and socioemotional influences such as deficits 
in intimate relationships (53) and aggressive or violent 
dispositions (54).
Additionally, existing polar conceptualisations of sexually 
motivated solicitation offenders are rather static. They 
offer little insight into the dynamic nature of the supporting 
offence process, or the factors that may support offending 
onset and persistence, particularly those factors that 
influence the escalation of offending behaviour. Perpetrator 
motivations and objectives in solicitation processes are 
dynamic and responsive to situational influences, changing 
as a function of technology use and in response to the 
variable dynamics of victim–offender interactions (55). More 
robust empirical understanding of the offender’s behavioural 
profiles is required, with attention to the dynamic influence 
of victim behaviours, responses, online contexts and other 
situational factors relating to offence progression.
The task of determining the profile of a perpetrator in oSCEC 
cases is additionally challenging due to the variety of tactics 
and deceptive strategies that are used. For this reason 
information retrieved from CyberTipline reports may not be 
53 Seto et al., 2012.
54 Wolak, J., Finkelhor, D. and Mitchell, K., ‘Internet-initiated sex crimes 
against minors: Implications for prevention based on findings from 
a national study’, Journal of Adolescent Health, Vol. 35, No 5, 2004, 
pp. 424.e11-424.e20.
55 E.g. Kloess, J. A., Beech, A. R., and Harkins, L., 2014. Online Child 
Sexual Exploitation Prevalence, Process, and Offender Characteristics. 
Trauma, Violence and Abuse, 15(2), pp. 126-139.
OFFENDER PROFILE
SEXUAL MOTIVATION 
 › Male.
 › Operates alone but shares / exchanges the 
acquired content.
 › May act on both international or national 
level.
 › Activity driven by knowledge of languages.
 › Targets female victims.
 › May know the victim in person.
 › Main goal: to obtain sexual material and/or 
sexual favours offline.
helpful, as it reflects only the perspective of the victim or of 
someone who reports on the victim’s behalf. In financially 
driven incidents the victims usually interact with a female, 
or someone who pretends to be female, so victims 
perception of the situation may not be reliable.
In answer to the EMPACT survey question about the 
typical profile of the offender behind oSCEC, the most 
apparent finding was that of all the experts surveyed (n = 
24), only two reported both males and females as being 
commonly implicated in these offences. None of the CSE 
experts reported that only females typically perpetrated 
online sexual coercion and extortion offences, and the 
great majority of them (22) reported that males were 
most commonly responsible for these offences. While 
the information about the gender of the most common 
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perpetrator in oSCEC cases was precise, the reported age 
range was dispersed. The experts reported perpetrators 
between 14 and 70 years old, the average age being 34 years 
old. It is assumed that the experts described perpetrators of 
sexual rather than financial procurements.
The motivation behind criminal activity also seems to 
define some further characteristics of the phenomenon 
under investigation: oSCEC is to be considered a global 
phenomenon, however when it is driven by sexual interest 
in children it does not appear to bear hallmarks of organised 
crime, as seems to be the case for its financially driven form.
Some recent initiatives undertaken by Interpol are 
worth mentioning here. In 2014 Interpol coordinated 
two operations — Operation Strikeback 1 and 2 — in the 
Philippines. Apart from the successful neutralisation of 
a few criminal groups based there, this intervention also 
highlighted some methodologies used by those groups. 
Operating on an almost industrial scale from call centre-style 
offices, cyber-blackmail agents were provided with training 
and offered bonus incentives such as holidays, cash or mobile 
phones for reaching their financial targets (56).
The problem has not been eradicated. Both increased 
reporting by law enforcement and media highlighted other 
key source countries. Besides the Philippines, criminals 
demand that money be remitted to Côte d’Ivoire and 
Morocco. To determine any potential way forward in 
dealing with the crime threat, the current efforts of law 
enforcement should focus on an assessment of its true scale 
and on further understanding the methodologies used in its 
furtherance.
 2.2. Victim profile 
The literature does not provide much insight into whether 
there is a ‘typical’ victim for sexual coercion and extortion 
and therefore, until more evidence is gathered, opinion-
based judgements should be avoided. There is certainly some 
evidence to suggest (57) that as young people get older they 
are more likely to become victims, but without a greater 
understanding of causation it would be difficult to draw 
conclusions. There may for example be a higher probability 
of coercion purely as a result of more unsupervised internet 
access and, in teen years, a failure to perceive risk given their 
developmental stage and associated vulnerability.
Gender distinctions are also difficult to determine from 
studies. It has been empirically established, for example, that 
girls are more likely to experience coercion to participate 
in SGSEM-related activities (58). It is, however, unclear 
whether this vulnerability extends to online sexual extortion 
56 https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-media/News/2014/N2014-075
57 E.g. IWF, 2015.
58 Daphne III research report, Safeguarding teenage intimate 
relationships (STIR): Connecting online and offline contexts and risks, 
2015, Bristol, United Kingdom. Available at: http://stiritup.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/STIR-Exec-Summary-English.pdf
OFFENDER PROFILE
FINANCIAL MOTIVATION  
 › Both genders.
 › Members of an organised criminal 
enterprise.
 › Operates in teams based in developing 
countries.
 › May act at both international and national 
level.
 › Targets male victims in countries linked by 
language.
 › Does not know the victim in person.
 › Main goal: to obtain money.
experiences, and whether girls are particularly vulnerable 
to coercive forms of online sexual extortion. While 
organisations such as the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) 
generally report that a higher prevalence of female SGSEM is 
collected, methodologies in such studies are not sufficiently 
complex to make inferences regarding whether this is due to 
a higher level of female victims or simply that such images 
are more likely to be found on the open internet.
In light of the above observations, NCMEC’s (59) analysis of a 
subset of sexual coercion and extortion-related CyberTipline 
reports may again be helpful in providing additional 
information on the subject matter:
 › 78 % of the reports involved female children and 15 % 
involved male children (in 8 % of reports, child gender 
could not be determined);
 › male and female children each ranged in age from 8 to 
17 and had an average age of 15; however, compared to 
female children, it was less common for male children to 
be on the younger end of the spectrum.
Further important observations regarding gender distinction 
were also made:
 › female children were blackmailed significantly more often 
for sexually explicit content (84 %) compared to male 
children (53 %);
 › male children were blackmailed significantly more often 
59 NCMEC, 2016.
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for money/goods (32 %) compared to female children 
(2 %).
While the majority of these manipulation tactics were 
used equally against male and female children, there were 
significant differences in the use of certain methods. More 
specifically, when child victims were male offenders were 
significantly more likely to pretend to be younger and/
or a female; offer to engage in sexual reciprocity through 
shared images or by live-streaming; and record the child 
unknowingly and then threaten to post the images/videos 
so family and friends could see. In contrast, when child 
victims were female, offenders were significantly more 
likely to offer something to get initial sexually explicit 
content from them, such as money or drugs (60).
In terms of the most common victims of online sexual 
coercion and extortion based on the CSE experts’ 
experience of the last 4 years, 14 out of 24 experts 
reported more female victims. Eight reported both male 
and female victims, while two also stressed that there was 
a greater number of female victims. One expert reported 
only male victims. The reported minimum age was 7 and 
the maximum 18. Only one expert reported an age range 
of 15 to 25, suggestive of the broader scope of this crime 
phenomenon and the fact that it affects adults as well as 
minors. The average of the minimum reported ages was 
11.2. The average of the maximum reported ages was 15.3 
(without the outlier value of 25).
Additional observations can be drawn from the already 
referenced data collected by AKEU in the United Kingdom. 
The majority of victims in cyber-enabled blackmail cases 
(1 247) reported to the AKEU in 2016 were male (1 107) 
and ranged in age from 8 to 82, with the largest number 
of victims in the 18-24 age range (443), however the total 
number of victims under 18 was 123. Female victims were 
significantly more likely to be targeted by solely sexually 
motivated offenders, with demands for further images or 
sexual contact made in 46.56 % of cases featuring female 
victims.
VICTIM PROFILE
 › Any person whose sexual material could be 
acquired by a perpetrator.
 › Usually female in case of sexually motivated 
perpetrators.
 › Usually male in case of financially motivated 
perpetrators.
In terms of the question about the number of victims of 
oSCEC that were identified (both in the country of the 
60 NCMEC, 2016.
expert and other countries), many CSE experts could not 
provide a total number, stressing again that there were no 
separate statistics to determine whether the child was a 
victim of online sexual coercion and extortion or another 
sexual offence. Those that have provided numbers reported 
between 40 and 300, with an average of 80 victims 
identified.
The experts had difficulties in answering the question on 
the average number of victims per case. Some of them 
mentioned one to two victims per case, while others 
reported 20 to 50 victims. The rest used descriptive 
phrasing in their responses instead of numbers, and such 
expressions as ‘a lot’ or ‘many’. One expert stressed the 
fact that even though he only mentioned an average 
of one victim per case the trend is up to five or six per 
case. Conclusions could not be drawn from such diverse 
information, which only stresses a need for further research 
in this domain.
Experts pointed out the following victim characteristics 
in cases of online sexual coercion end extortion affecting 
children:
 › naivety of the victims, either on a relational level or on a 
technical level;
 › absence of parental control;
 › willingness to share self-generated sexual content;
 › significant amount of time spent online each day;
 › use of social networks and other ways of online 
communication, especially through mobile devices;
 › befriending strangers (unknowns);
 › sexualised conversations with strangers;
 › lack of technical knowledge.
These data, however, do not necessarily provide an 
empirical rationale for the resulting coercion or abuse, as 
this is an interpretation by the survey respondent. While 
the reporting officers might suggest these are ‘reasons’ for 
the crime, without far more in-depth exploration of cases 
it is very difficult to prove this is the reason for the offence. 
For example, ‘absence of parental control’ or spending 
a lot of time online a lot are not necessarily causes of a 
young person becoming a victim of coercion. The responses 
may be a useful interpretation by those involved in the 
investigation of such crimes while highlighting the need for 
objectivity when interpreting victim motivations.
The two most emphatic risk factors for victimisation 
reflected in the answers of CSE experts related to a lack of 
knowledge about the dangers of the internet, along with a 
lack of parental control and the victim’s adverse personal 
situation or psychological state. Parental control should be 
considered here as meaning parental engagement, where 
young people are willing to discuss their online behaviour 
and any concerns they might have about the people 
they meet, and to disclose such in the event of upset or 
harm. In terms of the second category of low self-esteem, 
experiencing difficulties at school or with friends or family 
were most commonly mentioned as causation factors.  
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 3.1. Preventive response 
The significance of prevention at different levels to 
effectively reduce CSAE has been highlighted in the 
existing international legal instruments (61). Some of 
these provisions are echoed to some extent by national 
legislation, organisational solutions and academic 
literature. However, the development of a ‘culture of 
prevention’ around CSAE at the EU level is still ongoing, 
and Member States’ practices vary considerably in this 
field (62).
The development of successful preventive or awareness-
raising campaigns related to CSAE is not always simple. 
The CSAE crime phenomenon is multifaceted, with 
intricate subtleties; hence, crime-prevention campaigns 
often face challenges that can only be overcome through 
the combination of theory-based models with existing 
practical knowledge. The latest research highlights that the 
prioritisation of intervention and prevention in this domain 
must be on the basis of a multidisciplinary, public health 
approach in which all agents involved standardise their 
approaches, with clear and coherent primary aims and 
objectives (63).
An extensive online search was carried out in order 
61 Lanzarote Convention, Chapter II, ‘Preventive measures’; paragraph 
34 of the recital, Article 23 of the EU directive. 
62 Combating sexual abuse of children Directive 2011/93/
EU — European implementation assessment, 2017, p. 28. 
Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/
STUD/2017/598614/EPRS_STU%282017%29598614_EN.pdf
63 Key finding of the EU-funded report exploring policing and 
industry practice in the prevention of online child sexual abuse and 
the experience of young people online, including the experience of 
victimisation. EU Child Online Safety Project — Enhancing police and 
industry practice, 2016, p.8. Available at: http://www.mdx.ac.uk/__
data/assets/pdf_file/0017/250163/ISEC-report-FINAL.pdf
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to describe efforts to prevent oSCEC (64). The different 
types of initiatives that address the prevention of risky 
online behaviour in general were grouped into different 
categories. To better understand the different types of 
initiatives found the categories chosen according to the 
content and/or action plan of these initiatives were then 
divided into subcategories according to their content and 
form.
The first category groups together the initiatives that 
related to a more technological feature, such as guidelines 
for the IT industry or existing software that claims to 
prevent hazardous online behaviour (65). The items in the 
second category relayed a more academic background 
— studies and published articles of different sorts that 
provide a better understanding of the online behaviour of 
children and perpetrators. The third category was based on 
approaches coming from the law enforcement environment 
or other organisations/institutions dealing with CSAE-
related complaints (66). Finally, the fourth category was the 
most ‘hands-on’, including actions to raise awareness or to 
64 Although the aim of the search was to cast as wide a net as 
possible in order to have a better understanding of the international 
and national prevention of oSCEC, obvious limitations should 
be highlighted here. All the research was conducted in English, 
which undoubtedly excluded a certain number of other initiatives. 
Additionally, the analysis of the programmes was done only with the 
information available through open sources, possibly biasing how they 
were developed and their contents.
65 An interesting example of a technological feature is a model 
originating in Norway which has been successfully used in several 
other countries. When a user with a Bulgarian IP address wants to 
access a sexual coercion and extortion-dedicated online platform 
he/she is redirected to the website of the Bulgarian Cybercrime Unit 
where it is possible to report a crime (http://www.cybercrime.bg).
66 E.g. https://ceop.police.uk/ceop-reporting/
educate parents and children on the topic of unsafe online 
behaviour (67).
The main conclusion was that there were several 
programmes that addressed potentially unsafe online 
behaviour including sexting and phenomena like grooming 
or cyberbullying, but very few of these programmes directly 
and solely targeted oSCEC (68). These were presented either 
in a cartoon-type format or as short videos. Additionally, the 
initiatives found seemed not to fully comply with the theory 
behind effective prevention programmes (69), as only some of 
them incorporated some of what are considered the essential 
principles (70) of effective prevention programmes.
One issue with a number of prevention programmes in this 
domain was that they are ‘pull’-based in nature: the end user 
has to have at least a passing interest in the topic to access 
the materials. Empirical work (71) shows that while preventive 
programmes targeting such behaviours as sexting are often 
established, when they are delivered poorly it is unlikely 
that young people will view them favourably. Preventive 
programmes can lay the foundations and provide materials 
for effective learning, but they need to be integrated into 
broader education content, with appropriate levels of 
discussion and follow-up support for young people.
Effective preventive programmes should ideally result in 
a mix of the different existing types of interventions using 
various methods. In terms of the CSAE domain there is a 
need to develop education programmes that acknowledge 
that sometimes something wrong happens, and to provide 
more of an empathetic or incident-response approach. 
Encouraging young people to be more critical in their 
online interactions rather than attempting to prevent them 
engaging in behaviours which enact the exploration of their 
sexual identities is essential to this approach. Some research 
findings focusing exclusively on oSCEC suggest (72) that it is 
important to base preventive programmes in case studies. 
67 E.g. http://swgfl.org.uk/products-services/esafety/resources/So-You-
Got-Naked-Online/Content/Sexting-Toolkit; https://www.facebook.
com/help/726709730764837/?helpref=hc_fnav
68 E.g. http://www.missingkids.org/sextortionpsa; http://www.
sextorsion.es/; http://ow.ly/ePX9306ESpR
69 Nation, M., Crusto, C., Wandersman, A., Kumpfer, K. L., Seybolt, D., 
Morrissey-Kane, E. and Davino, K., ‘What works in prevention: Principles 
of effective prevention programs’, American Psychologist, Vol. 58, 
No 6/7, 2003, pp. 449-456. Available at: http://www.ncdsv.org/images/
AmPsy_WhatWorksInPrevention_6-7-2003.pdf
70 Ibid. Principles related to programme characteristics: comprehensive, 
varied teaching methods, theory driven, positive relationships. 
Principles related to matching the programme with a target population: 
appropriately timed, socioculturally relevant. Principles related to 
implementation and evaluation of prevention programmes: outcome 
evaluation, well-trained staff.
71 E.g. Phippen, A., 2012. Sexting: An Exploration of Practices, Attitudes 
and Influences. Available at:  https://www.nspcc.org.uk/globalassets/
documents/research-reports/sexting-exploration-practices-attitudes-
influences-report-2012.pdf; Ringrose, J., Gill, R., Livingstone, S., Harvey, 
L., 2012. A qualitative study of children, young people and ‘sexting’ – A 
report prepared for the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty 
to Children.
72 Kopecký, 2016, p. 20.
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TECHNICAL FEATURE
 › Guidelines for IT industry.
 › Prevention software.
 › Safer internet policies.
ACADEMIC APPROACH
 › Comparative law studies.
 › Studies on offenders in the virtual world/
grooming.
 › Virtual- versus real-world studies.
 › Evaluation of national strategies.
 › Focus on the importance of prevention.
LAW ENFORCEMENT-ORIENTED ACTIONS
 › Websites for the online reporting of CSAE-
related crime.
 › Police advice/warnings on newspapers.
EDUCATION AND AWARENESS RAISING
 › Advice for parents/children on online 
behaviour.
The added value of this method is a higher level of influence 
on the child, and at the same time they are trained on how 
to react if they ever face a similar situation (73). On a final 
note, the preventive programmes addressing threats in the 
online environment should be included in national school 
curricula.
The massive importance of prevention can be supported 
by information originating from a number of sources on the 
consequences of oSCEC (74), including cases of self-harm 
or even suicide (75). Among CSE experts who felt able to 
provide feedback on the question of whether the child’s 
experiences led to them threatening or engaging in self-
harm, including sexual self-harm or even suicide (n = 20), 12 
replied affirmatively and four reported suicide or suicidal 
behaviours. Eight experts replied in the negative. This small 
sample, even if very limited by the source data, stresses the 
value of prevention in responding to the crime threat.
According to the outcomes of NCMEC’s study, child victims 
commonly experienced a range of negative outcomes, 
including hopelessness, fear, anxiety and depression. 
Overall, it was indicated in 13 % of CyberTipline reports 
focusing on oSCEC that the child victim had experienced 
some type of negative outcome. Of those reports with 
some type of negative outcome, it was indicated that about 
one in three children (31 %; 4 % of all oSCEC reports) had 
engaged in self-harm, threatened suicide or attempted 
suicide as a result of the victimisation. There were no child 
gender or age differences in regard to negative outcomes. 
It was also common that concern was expressed for other 
potential victims, and was a likely reason for making the 
report (76).
Without any doubt the key message which should 
be conveyed by prevention and awareness-raising 
interventions targeting the phenomenon under 
investigation is that oSCEC is a crime and perpetrators will 
be prosecuted. It is also essential that such interventions 
focus on the key elements of oSCEC: material, threat 
and value and align particular actions around them. 
Furthermore, since the occurrence of sexual material that 
can be acquired by a perpetrator is crucial to triggering 
the process of oSCEC, specific attention should be given to 
‘material’-oriented interventions. It seems that applying 
the knowledge already gathered within the research 
on the types of youth-produced sexual content-related 
behaviours (77), such as sexting, to initiatives aiming at 
preventing the irresponsible sharing of sexual material 
is to be considered a starting point. To make such an 
intervention complete and address instances of technically 
assisted coercion, continued efforts aiming at raising 
73 E.g. http://virtualglobaltaskforce.com/resources/case-studies/
74 E.g. https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/sextortion
75 At least four suicides in the United Kingdom, including minor 
victims, have been linked to this form of criminal activity; e.g. http://
www.bbc.com/news/uk-38150313
76  NCMEC, 2016.
77 E. g. Project Spirto: ‘Self-produced images — risk taking online’. 
Available at: http://www.spirto.health.ed.ac.uk/
awareness of safety features that could be applied to 
prevent use of hacking or malware are needed.
In any preventive undertaking the key elements of oSCEC 
should be explained in the context of offence processes (78). 
Providing adequate advice and tools reflecting victim and 
abuser behaviour at each stage of such processes can 
reinforce the victim’s position and disrupt the victimisation 
process. As indicated in the NCMEC’s survey it was not 
uncommon for children to believe that complying would 
make the blackmail stop. This would suggest that given 
a proper explanation on the consequences of complying 
or not with a particular perpetrator’s demands, a victim 
could be in a better position to effectively counteract 
those demands. An additional example of tailor-made 
advice can be found in the bullet points of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation’s leaflet ‘Defence against sexual 
extortion’, where it is stated that: ‘it is not a crime for a 
child to send sexually explicit images to someone if they are 
compelled to do so, so victims should not be afraid to tell 
law enforcement if they are being sexually exploited’ (79). 
This knowledge may be crucial for a child victim, not only 
in terms of disclosure but also in responding to some 
manipulative strategies used by perpetrators.
The analysis of the present preventive and awareness-
raising initiatives in the context of the characteristics of 
oSCEC, especially its impact on victims, indicated a clear 
need for a specific kind of preventive intervention, which 
would be closely linked with the existing reporting and 
victim-support mechanisms. Such an intervention has been 
included in the operational action plan 2017 of the Child 
Sexual Exploitation European Multidisciplinary Platform 
Against Criminal Threats, and will be explained in the next 
part of the report.
3.2. Reporting and support 
mechanisms
Embarrassment regarding the material provided to the 
perpetrator or lack of awareness by potential victims that 
they have experienced a criminal offence have already been 
mentioned as the main reasons for heavy underreporting 
of cases of oSCEC. Additionally, it seems to be the case 
that some legislation may treat the victims as offenders, 
comparing the actions of a child taking a nude photograph 
and sending the media over the internet to that of 
producing CSEM. This shaming of the victim perpetuates 
the child’s victimisation and creates a culture that is not-
conducive to disclosing victimisation.
According to the CSE experts, notifications about cases of 
oSCEC were received by their respective units via multiple 
78 For user concern on how oSCEC takes place from the research that 
directly deals with this crime phenomenon see Kopecký, 2016, p. 16.
79 http://www.westwarwickpd.org/Other/Sextortion_Affecting_
Thousands_of_US_Children.pdf
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sources. Around 70 % were reported directly by the victims, 
family members or teachers. Some experts mentioned 
proactive investigations online and international police 
channels, including Interpol, when the investigation is 
conducted outside of the country and a victim is a citizen 
of that country. The third category was reporting by the 
private sector and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
acknowledging the role of INHOPE’s hotlines (80) and 
NCMEC in this process.
Although the answers given by the CSE experts were 
rather broad, they already indicate a very important 
characteristic of the existing reporting mechanisms: they 
follow a multidisciplinary approach, in a form of cross-
reporting, where different actors are represented. While 
this approach seems to be appropriate, there are some 
challenges that arise from the goals of each of the actors 
that may influence the coherence and effectiveness of 
both national and international reporting mechanisms. It 
is therefore essential that those actors work together to 
minimise the duplication of efforts and provide optimal 
input into the whole process.
NCMEC pointed out (81) important child gender and age 
differences among those who made the reports. While 
male children were significantly more likely than female 
children to self-report, female children were significantly 
more likely than male children to have internet companies 
and peers report on their behalf. Parents/guardians and 
other authority figures were equally likely to report for 
male and female children. Furthermore, while self-reports 
and reports by internet company were more likely among 
older children, reports by parents/guardians, authority 
figures and online strangers were more likely among 
younger children. Peers were equally likely to report for 
older and younger children.
Child victims disclosing their victimisation is a vital element 
in the disruption of the offending and victimisation 
processes. It is therefore of utmost importance to deepen 
the above-presented findings, aiming at indicating factors 
favourable to disclosing victimisation. These factors should 
then be reflected in features of the reporting mechanisms 
and their tools to make them adequate and clear. The role 
of the private sector and its gatekeeper responsibilities 
need to be stressed here, especially in the light of the 
previously referenced key findings of the EU-funded 
research on policing and industry practice in the prevention 
of online child sexual abuse (82). According to them, with 
regard to industry safety practice some young people 
complained that safety procedures and report mechanisms 
were too complicated to follow, and there were also a 
number of misconceptions about reporting inappropriate 
material which stopped individuals from acting.
80 INHOPE is an active and collaborative global network of hotlines 
dealing with illegal content online and committed to stamping out 
child sexual abuse from the internet. More information is available at: 
http://www.inhope.org/gns/who-we-are/at-a-glance.aspx
81 NCMEC, 2016. 
82 EU Child Online Safety Project, 2016, p. 10.
More detailed information on those who report 
incidents of oSCEC can be retrieved from the 
NCMEC study (*). Overall, internet companies 
were the most common reporters of oSCEC to 
the CyberTipline (33%), followed by the child 
victims (24%) and parents/guardians (22%).
The high percentage of reporting by internet 
companies should, however, be interpreted 
in the light of the specificity of CyberTipline 
reporting mechanism, which offers a practical 
solution to the duty provided for in US law for 
the reporting of incidents of CSAE by online 
platforms. Interestingly, almost half of internet 
company reports made to the CyberTipline 
were known to have originated as self-reports, 
making the child victims the most common 
direct or indirect reporter of oSCEC incidents 
that were ultimately processed by the 
CyberTipline (38%).
Other reporters to the CyberTipline included 
peers (e.g. friends, romantic partners, siblings; 
7%), authority figures (e.g. police, teachers, 
counsellors; 5%) and online strangers to the 
child (3%).
* NCMEC, 2016.
22A RESPONSE TO THE PHENOMENON
Bearing in mind the complexity of oSCEC and its impact 
on the victims, however, the challenge is not only to 
make those who want to report its incidents aware of 
the available reporting mechanisms, but also to provide 
a child victim with support that may be needed in 
particular circumstances, including very dynamic scenarios. 
Characteristics and key elements of the phenomenon under 
investigation should again serve as a basis to indicate the 
most effective methods of support. Organisations acting in 
this domain should evaluate their procedures and resources 
in the context of what community support may be available 
to victims of oSCEC, including immediate interventions. 
Support for victims should also be ensured at every stage 
of the oSCEC process, to help them in overcoming negative 
outcomes. The long-term goal is to create a supportive 
society response, which would reduce the persistence 
of victim blaming in relation to sexual offences. The 
importance of the role of professionals in close contact 
with children, along with helplines, should be underlined 
here (83).
As was already mentioned, a unique preventive campaign 
(84) has been developed as one of the activities of the Child 
Sexual Exploitation European Multidisciplinary Platform 
Against Criminal Threats, aiming at awareness raising and 
83 For user concern on this see also Combating sexual abuse of children 
Directive 2011/93/EU — European implementation assessment, p. 51.
84 www.europol.europa.eu/sayno
strengthening reporting and support mechanisms as a 
response to the threat of oSCEC. The campaign builds on 
global and universal features of oSCEC, and provides tools 
that, with minor modifications reflecting sociodemographic 
differences, can be easily adopted on a national level in 
every EU Member State and beyond.
The awareness-raising goal of this undertaking is to 
be achieved by explaining key elements of oSCEC and 
its characteristics, especially two main motivations of 
perpetrators, in a short video (85) translated into all EU 
languages, along with additional informative content 
broadcast through the websites of EC3, law enforcement 
agencies and other stakeholders who have decided to 
support this initiative.
To achieve the second goal of the campaign, the CSE experts 
have focused on strengthening the cooperation among the 
relevant stakeholders in their respective countries to work 
out the most effective way of handling notifications about 
incidents of oSCEC and providing the necessary support to 
victims at the same time. The contact details of these actors 
are to be communicated in numerous ways as a part of the 
campaign.
85 EC3 would like to acknowledge the support of the students of The 
International School of The Hague in The Netherlands, who were very 
helpful in consulting both the script of the video and its draft. 
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